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CHAPTER SEVEN
"in all cases of felony"
7.010. INTRODUCTION
The supreme court has original appellate jurisdiction over felonies; ap-
peals in misdemeanor cases are heard by the courts of appeals.' Because
jurisdiction depends on the classification of the offense under consideration,
the reviewing court must identify the offense involved and decide whether
it should be classified as felony or misdemeanor.
7.020. IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
Generally, felonies are distinguished from misdemeanors according to the
maximum potential punishment made possible by conviction. If punishable
by death or imprisonment in the state penitentiary, the offense is a felony;
if punishable by fine or county jail sentence, it is a misdemeanor.2 Since the
1. The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction of a case involving a misdemeanor,
unless it fits another category of exclusive supreme court appellate jurisdiction. State v.
Powers, 350 Mo. 942, 169 S.W.2d 377, trans'd, 176 S.W.2d 293 (Ct. App. 1943);
State v. Monroe, 278 S.W. 723 (Mo. 1925), trans'd, 289 S.W. 29 (Ct. App. 1926);
State v. Cox, 259 S.W. 1041 (Mo.), trans'd, 266 S.W. 734 (Ct. App. 1924); State v.
Graham, 295 Mo. 695, 247 S.W. 194 (1922), trans'd, 250 S.W. 925 (Ct. App.), re-
trans'd, 301 Mo. 272, 256 S.W. 770 (1923), retrans'd; State v. Cook, 217 Mo. 236, 117
S.W. 30 (1909), trans'd, 148 Mo. App. 383, 128 S.W. 212 (1910); State v. Gamma,
215 Mo. 100, 114 S.W. 619 (1908), trans'd, 149 Mo. App. 694, 129 S.W. 734 (1910);
State v. Nicholson, 116 Mo. 522, 22 S.W. 804 (1893), trans'd, 56 Mo. App. 412 (1894);
State v. Ciarelli, 366 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1963); State v. Hunter, 198 S.W.2d
544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946). But see State v. Thayer, 158 Mo. 36, 58 S.W. 12 (1900),
which indicates that prior to 1900, the supreme court took jurisdiction of numerous
misdemeanor appeals apparently without considering whether they fell within one of the
categories of exclusive appellate jurisdiction. This case is also discussed § 8.020, note 6.
Another indication that the supreme court presently refuses jurisdiction if the case does
not involve a jurisdictional "felony" is State v. Harold, 364 Mo. 1052, 271 S.W.2d
527 (1954), trans'd, 281 S.W.2d 605 (Ct. App. 1955), holding that appeals in juvenile
proceedings lie in the courts of appeals. The fact that the offense would have been a
felony if committed by an adult was held insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the supreme
court. See also State v. Heath, 352 Mo. 1147, 181 S.W.2d 517 (1944). When presented
with a case involving a misdemeanor conviction for malicious trespass to land, the su-
preme court refused to set up a hybrid basis for jurisdiction between the felony and
title to realty categories. State v. Zinn, 141 Mo. 329, 42 S.W. 938 (1897). It was held
that the court of appeals had properly taken jurisdiction of the appeal (61 Mo. App.
476 (1895)) although the case was analogous to those falling within both categories.
Accord, State v. McNeary, 88 Mo. 143 (1885). The significance of these holdings is
further discussed, § 7.020, note 7.
2. State v. Kollenborn, 304 S.W.2d 855 (Mo. 1957); State v. Combs, 301 S.W.2d
529 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957), trans'd; State v. Lehr, 16 Mo. App. 491 (1885). This also
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decisive factor is the potential punishment, not the sentence actually im-
posed, an offense may be a felony for purposes of jurisdiction if only a fine
or jail sentence is imposed.'
Jurisdictional problems have arisen in cases in which the same course of
conduct might constitute two substantive offenses, one a felony and the other
a misdemeanor. Graded offenses4 have presented special problems. Prior
to 1913, the courts, with two exceptions,' ruled that when a defendant had
been charged in such a way that he could have been convicted of either a
has long been the basic test in this state for non-jurisdictional classifications. State v.
Thomas, 343 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. 1961); State v. Diffenbacher, 51 Mo. 26 (1872).
See Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.020 (Supp. 1963); Mo. REv. STAT. § 556.040 (1959).
An exception to the potential punishment test exists in two older cases. State v.
Tummons, 225 Mo. App. 429, 37 S.W.2d 499 (1931), held that the label affixed to an
offense by the general assembly takes precedence over potential punishment. Thus if an
offense is labeled misdemeanor even though punishable by penitentiary sentence, the
courts of appeals have jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Stinger v. Krueger, 280 Mo. 293,
217 S.W. 310 (1919). Arguably this exception is invalid in light of the present statu-
tory definition of felony in section 556.020 which includes only offenses punishable by
death or penitentiary sentence "and no other." The provision specifies that this defini-
tion shall apply to all statutes of the state.
3. State v. Ulrich, 316 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. 1958) (leaving scene of accident); State v.
Dikos, 294 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1956) (keeping gaming devices); State v. Owen, 258
S.W.2d 662 (Mo. 1953) (exhibiting deadly weapon); State v. Klink, 363 Mo. 907,
254 S.W.2d 650 (1953) (molesting a minor); State v. Box, 169 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1943)
(driving while intoxicated); State v. La France, 165 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. 1942) (taking
and making away with motor vehicle); State v. Ellis, 159 S.W.2d 675 (Mo. 1942)
(fraudulent execution of deed); State v. Coppersmith, 152 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. 1941)
(receiving stolen property); State v. Minter, 84 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. 1935) (driving while
intoxicated); State v. Brown, 306 Mo. 532, 267 S.W. 864 (1924) (carrying concealed
weapon); State v. Criddle, 302 Mo. 634, 259 S.W. 429 (1924) (driving while intoxi-
cated); State v. Gabriel, 301 Mo. 365, 256 S.W. 765 (1923) (aggravated assault);
State v. Oldenhage, 185 Mo. 618, 84 S.W. 873 (1904) (assault with intent to kill);
State v. Green, 66 Mo. 631 (1877) (assault with intent to kill); Johnston v. State,
7 Mo. 183 (1841) (felonious assault); State v. Combs, 301 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. Ct. App.
1957), trans'd (driving while intoxicated); State v. Plassard, 190 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1945), trans'd, 355 Mo. 90, 195 S.W.2d 495 (1946) (exhibiting deadly weapon);
State v. McLelland, 272 S.W. 700 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 312 Mo. 68, 278 S.W. 981
(1925) (maiming a bull); State v. Huffman, 264 S.W. 79 (Mo. Ct. App.), transd,
267 S.W. 838 (1924) (carnal knowledge of female minor); State v. McGovern, 159
Mo. App. 134, 139 S.W. 231, trans'd, 237 Mo. 248, 140 S.W. 867 (1911) (assault with
intent to kill); State v. Herrick, 158 Mo. App. 487, 139 S.W. 258, trans'd, 237 Mo. 204,
140 S.W. 873 (1911) (seduction); State v. Melton, 53 Mo. App. 646, trans'd, 117 Mo.
618, 23 S.W. 889 (1893) (assault with intent to rape); State v. Gilmore, 28 Mo. App.
561 (1888), trans'd, 98 Mo. 206, 11 S.W. 620 (1889) (gambling).
4. This term as used here is synonymous with "included offenses."
5. Clearly in State v. Wilson, 140 Mo. App. 726, 126 S.W. 996, trans'd, 230 Mo.
647, 132 S.W. 238 (1910), and arguably in State v. McMahill, 214 Mo. 310, 113 S.W.
1071 (1908), the court referred to the information rather than the conviction to de-
termine jurisdiction.
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felony or a lesser included misdemeanor, the nature of the conviction would
govern for jurisdictional purposes.' In 1913 the supreme court transferred
State v. Woodson7 in which the verdict and the judgment of conviction had
been of felony.8 This case could be interpreted as holding that appeals in all
cases of graded offenses should be heard by the courts of appeals, whether
the conviction had been of felony or misdemeanor.9 However, the subse-
quent case law, without expressly overruling Woodson, has ignored this
possible interpretation and has restored the pre-1913 rule that the conviction
determines jurisdiction. Thus, an appeal of felony is heard by the supreme
court; of a lesser included misdemeanor, by the court of appeals. Represent-
ative cases presenting the problem-receiving stolen property," stealing by
6. State v. Greenspan, 137 Mo. 149, 38 S.W. 582, trans'd, 70 Mo. App. 468 (1897)
(charged with felony of receiving stolen property, jury found property worth less than
$30); State v. Saye, 109 Mo. 224, 19 S.W. 65 (1892), trans'd (indicted for aggravated
assault, found quilty of common assault); State v. White, 109 Mo. 223, 19 S.W. 65
(1892), trans'd, 52 Mo. App. 285 (1893); accord, State v. Amos, 165 Mo. App. 213, 145
S.W. 864 (1912); State v. Johnston, 154 Mo. App. 265, 134 S.W. 38 (1911).
7. 248 Mo. 705, 154 S.W. 705 (1913), trans'd, 175 Mo. App. 393, 162 S.W. 327
(1914).
8. The defendants had been convicted of receiving stolen property worth more than
$30, which amount at that time separated felony and misdemeanor in cases of receiv-
ing stolen property, larceny and false pretenses. The case was initially appealed to the
Kansas City Court of Appeals which transferred on motion to the supreme court. The
court of appeals opinion upon retransfer is the only clear discussion of the verdict. 175
Mo. App. 393, 162 S.W. 327 (1914). This opinion indicates that the court of appeals
was baffled by the result reached in the supreme court, although it acquiesced in that
result.
9. Two cases decided after Woodson handled this possible interpretation in an un-
satisfactory manner. State v. Sparks, 180 Mo. App. 495, 166 S.W. 642 (1914), trans'd,
263 Mo. 609, 173 S.W. 1057 (1915), represents an attempt to reconcile Woodson with
the pre-1913 law. The court of appeals sought to explain that Woodson stood for the
proposition that an offense remains a felony even though less than a penitentiary sen-
tence is imposed, rather than for the denial of supreme court jurisdiction in all cases of
graded offenses. However, the court failed to advert to the result reached in Woodson.
State v. Eggleston, 27 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1930), which involved, as did
Woodson, the offense of receiving stolen property, was the only case found in which the
result in Woodson was followed. The court cited Woodson for the proposition that "in
this particular class of offense, the jurisdiction on appeal is in this court, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the information charges the commission of a felony ... ."Id. at 728.
This was the only reference to jurisdiction and the court did not state how it reached its
interpretation of Woodson. Eggleston has apparently been ignored. See note 10 infIra
and accompanying text.
10. See State v. Ham, 104 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1937) (supreme court retained juris-
diction of conviction for receiving property in the amount of $63 without jurisdictional
comment); State v. Weiss, 185 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945) (charge of receiving
property worth more than $30, convicted of receiving less).
1 7.020 FELONY
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deceit or false pretenses,: larceny, 2 and assault"3-indicate that this is now
the rule.
Several cases have presented problems of identification and classification
because of ambiguous verdicts or discrepancies between the verdict and the
judgment. In these cases the offense for which the defendant was convicted
determined jurisdiction, but to identify that offense, the reviewing court had
to look to the trial record. In State v. Bradley,4 the circuit court judgment
recited a conviction for grand larceny, but the record revealed that the ver-
dict was guilty of petit larceny. The form of the judgment was not control-
ling and the court of appeals retained jurisdiction.
When the defendant has been charged with the felony part of a graded
offense and he is found "guilty as charged," there has been a felony rather
than a misdemeanor conviction and the supreme court has jurisdiction."5
The matter is more complicated when the verdict in a graded offense is the
general one of "guilty." One case' 8 has held that since the defendant was
charged with stealing by deceit an amount of money far in excess of the
minimum for felony, and there was nothing in the record or in the general
verdict of "guilty" to indicate a finding that a lesser amount had been taken,
it could be presumed for jurisdictional purposes that the conviction had been
one of felony.
Thus, the general rule is that the substantive offense is identified by refer-
ence to the conviction and that offense is then classified as felony or mis-
demeanor for jurisdictional purposes. There is at least one necessary ex-
ception, which is illustrated in appeals by the state from the quashing of
informations. In these cases, the offense charged by the information will
11. State v. Fenner, 358 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1962); State v. Neal, 350 Mo. 1002, 169
S.W.2d 686 (1943); see State v. Green, 305 S.W.2d 863 (Mo. 1957).
12. See State v. Willis, 283 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1955); State v. Murphy, 256 S.W. 743
(Mo. 1923), transd, 264 S.W. 422 (Ct. App. 1924); State v. Bradley, 247 S.W.2d 351
(Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
One case may be distinguished because it involved a different form of larceny. The
supreme court retained jurisdiction in State v. West, 349 Mo. 221, 161 S.W.2d 966
(1942), involving a theft from the person, which remained a felony even though less than
$30 had been taken.
13. State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (1950); State v. Gabriel, 301 Mo.
365, 256 S.W. 765 (1923); State v. Smith, 284 Mo. 168, 223 S.W. 749 (1920); State v.
Teague, 263 Mo. 336, 172 S.W. 593, trans'd, 190 Mo. App. 280, 176 S.W. 250 (1915);
State v. Keith, 235 S.W.2d 1023 (Mo. Ct. App.), trans'd, 241 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1951).
14. 247 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
15. State v. Garner, 360 Mo. 50, 226 S.W.2d 604 (1950); State v. Keith, 235
S.W.2d 1023 (Mo. Ct. App.), transd, 241 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1951).
16. State v. Fenner, 358 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. 1962). But see State v. Krouse, 171 Mo.
App. 424, 156 S.W. 727 (1913).
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FELONY
determine appellate jurisdiction, 7 because there is no conviction to which
to refer.
The absence of a conviction may have caused the supreme court to
refer to the information on defendant's appeal in the 1924 case of State
v. Griddle.'8 The court's discussion of jurisdiction, however, implies that
the information should be used as the jurisdictional referent as a matter
of course: "Appeal was properly granted to this court, because the crime
which the information purported to charge against the appellant was one
for which imprisonment in the penitentiary might have been imposed .... ""
To resolve this apparent inconsistency, it is necessary to consider the court's
disposition on the merits. The court first noted that a statute redefining the
offense in question as a felony was not effective at the time of defendant's
alleged criminal act. The court admitted that the offensive act could there-
fore constitute only a misdemeanor under the older statute defining the
offense, and that the insertion of the word "feloniously" in the information
was an error of the prosecutor. However, the court's decision apparently
indicates that there could have been no conviction either of the felony or of
the misdemeanor: the case was reversed on the ground that prosecution for
the offense was barred by the statute of limitations. This apparently left no
alternative but to refer to the information which purported to charge a
felony. It is arguable that the correct result was reached, but it is unfortu-
nate that the statement of jurisdiction does not inform the reader of the
reason for reference to the information.
Under the view that the result on the merits corrects the jurisdictional
statement, the Criddle case may be squared with another decision" in the
same year. In this case a statute defining the offense in question as a felony
had, before commission of the offense, been repealed by a statute defining it
as a misdemeanor. The supreme court held that the fact the prosecutor
used the term "feloniously" in the information could not confer jurisdiction.
In this case there had been a conviction (necessarily of the misdemeanor)
and the court referred to it rather than to the information purporting to
charge a felony.
There were three cases decided during the Prohibition Era in which the
17. State v. Scarlet, 291 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. 1956); State v. Meyer, 246 Mo. 596,
152 S.W. 331 (1912), transd; cf. State v. Brooks, 372 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1963).
In this situation, the unilateral action of the prosecutor in preparing the information,
in effect, confers jurisdiction on the proper court, since nothing else is available for
the court's determination of the offense involved.
18. 302 Mo. 634, 259 S.W. 429 (1924).
19. Id. at 636, 259 S.W. at 429. (Emphasis added.)
20. State v. Bressie, 304 Mo. 71, 262 S.W. 1015, trans'd, 266 S.W. 766 (Ct. App.
1924).
§ 7.020
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courts' language deceptively appears to stress reference to the information
rather than the conviction. In State v. Pullam2" the defendant had been
charged with the felony of illegally manufacturing whiskey, but was allowed
to plead guilty to the misdemeanor of possession of a still. A jail sentence
was imposed and a stay of execution during good behavior was ordered.
When this order was revoked, the defendant appealed to the Springfield
Court of Appeals, which held that it did not have jurisdiction because the
original information had not been altered and still specified a felony. This
holding appears to conflict with the conviction test. However, there is further
reasoning in the opinion to the effect that the misdemeanor to which the
defendant pleaded was not a lesser included offense of the felony with which
he was charged, so that he could not be convicted of the misdemeanor. The
court therefore, was apparently saying there was no conviction available as a
referent, which left no alternative but to refer to the information.
A complication in the liquor cases arose because of a statutory definition
of "possession of a still fit for use" as a misdemeanor, while the same stat-
ute22 defined actual use of the still as a felony. Two cases23 arising under this
statute contain language which may indicate that the supreme court was
construing the informations in order to identify the offense involved; but it
is also possible that reference was made to the informations as an aid in
determining of which offense each defendant was convicted.24
21. 293 S.W. 484 (Mo. Ct. App. 1927).
22. Mo. Laws 1923, at 237, § 2.
23. Compare State v. Harrison, 292 S.W. 415 (Mo. 1927), with State v. Turner, 273
S.W. 739 (Mo. 1925), trans'd, 284 S.W. 827 (Ct. App. 1926).
24. The informations were similarly worded in both cases, but one was construed to
charge a felony and the other, a misdemeanor. There is some indication in both opinions,
however, that because the one case had been conducted as a felony trial and the other
as a misdemeanor, it was understood by both the prosecutor and the trial judge at the
time of judgment that the convictions were for felony and misdemeanor, respectively.
Thus the language of the court in these two cases (creating the impression that the court
was looking solely to the information) is misleading. In State v. Turner, supra note 23,
at 740, the court stated: "It is plain that the information in this case charges a misde-
meanor in the possession of such still, and does not charge that the defendant used it.
Therefore defendant was tried and convicted of a misdemeanor, of which this court has
not jurisdiction, unless a constitutional question is properly raised and preserved." (Em-
phasis added.)
In State v. Harrison, supra note 23, at 416, the court stated: "The allegation in
the amended information ... effectually charges a felony .... This court, therefore, has
appellate jurisdiction." However, just above its jurisdictional statement, the Harrison
court, in distinguishing Turner, made this statement: "That case was tried as a felony.
This case was tried as a misdemeanor."
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7.030. CONCLUSION
The only recurrent jurisdictional problems under the felony category are
the identification of the substantive offense involved on appeal and the
classification of that offense as felony or misdemeanor. Generally, when there
has been a conviction, the courts refer to it to make the requisite identifica-
tion and classification. Only when no conviction is available, is reference
made to the original charge or information. However, failure of the courts
to articulate consistently that they refer to the conviction when possible has
often resulted in confusing implications that the original charge, not the
conviction, is always the controlling factor. The rule that conviction governs
when available is so simple to apply that it is surprising to find jurisdictional
statements by the courts which are either completely uninformative, or con-
fusing in their dependency upon the disposition of the merits.
In addition, there is some authority that the jurisdictional question should
not be determined by anticipation of the court's consideration of the merits.
In Fisher v. Lavelock,6 in considering whether it had jurisdiction on the
ground that title to real estate was involved, the supreme court stated:
[W]e will disregard the fact that the land described in the option is
located in Texas. If we were to hold that we did not have jurisdiction
because the land in question is not located in Missouri, such would be
an adjudication upon the merits. That holding would apply with equal
force to the jurisdiction of all courts in this state. Therefore, in deter-
mining this question, we will consider only the type of action and the
relief sought. 6
The failure of the courts in felony cases to consider this rationale is further
evidence that "felony" cases have determined jurisdiction on an ad hoc
basis and have not maintained a view to the overall problem of appellate
jurisdiction.
25. 282 S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1955), trans'd, 290 S.W.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1956).
26. Id. at 560; see Fowler v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 S.W.2d 672 (Mo. 1963),
discussed § 9.015, note 35.
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